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Q

ualia are layered and complex,
a labyrinth of a concept,
rife with debate as to their
existence, state, and what they mean
for our understanding of knowledge,
relationship with the world, and
ourselves. Thoughtful exploration into
the complexities of what qualia are
and how they relate to the mind-body
problem will be wrestled with though
research applied within this paper.
Qualia can be found in philosophical
debates surrounding epistemology
and in branches across the spectrum,
from Rene Descartes to Simone de
Beauvoir. While not mentioned by
name, the concept of qualia has played
a large part in philosophy’s quest to
understand humanity, and by extension,
to understand others who share our
humanity. In our current culture of
increasingly polarized political, racial,
gendered, and cultural views, qualia are
a concept that can shed light and insight
for better understanding of those whose
experience is fundamentally different
from our own. Qualia offer a description
to the nature of experience, and can offer
a new way of understanding the barriers
and divides between individuals.
Understanding can break down the
walls of fear that fuel divides, and qualia
are one way to bring understanding into
a world desperate for more.
In this paper, we will go over

the basic philosophic understanding
of qualia today. We will see how
consciousness is necessary for qualia,
and why this makes defining qualia
a challenge. Next, we will go over the
explanatory gap of qualia. From there,
we will see how qualia relate to the mindbody problem, and the early exploration
of this problem through Descartes,
Locke, and Berkeley. Additionally, we
will go over the main schools of thought
that surround the mind-body problem:
materialism, idealism, and dualism.
These schools cover a spectrum of
views on the mind-body problem and
offer solutions based on their respective
frameworks. However, we will find
that materialism and idealism fail to
present a compelling solution to the
mind-body problem, nor a framework
that sustains qualia. Dualism, on the
other hand, offers a framework that can
better support solutions to the mindbody problem and qualia. Then, we
will look at some more contemporary
understandings of the senses and
qualia’s relationship to the mind-body
problem. The goal of this paper is to give
a general overview of qualia, the mindbody problem, and the various solutions
philosophical schools offer. Ultimately,
we will see how qualia and the mindbody problem relate to one another
and gain a deeper understanding of the
various views that surround these two
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topics.

states” (Wright 90). What this means
for us, is that our nature as conscious
beings allow qualia to be intrinsic to our
experience. Furthermore, since qualia
are intrinsic to our experience, it is clear
that they originate from mind. One way
to illustrate qualia is the classic blackand-white room example:
Mary is raised in a black and
white room in which she learns
all the cognitive and functional
facts about color vision. When
she ventures outside that room
for the first time, she learns (upon
perceiving a ripe red tomato) a new
fact about color vision, something
she was not able to infer from her
knowledge of the cognitive and
functional aspects of color-vision.
“This is what it is like to see red,”
she might think to herself. “I didn’t
know what that was like before”.
(Wright 92-93)
Mary learned all she could,
all of the facts about color and vision.
But this is unable to give her qualia,
since it does not arise from her sensory
experience. She only knows what it is
like because she experiences it, and this
“what it is like” is required for qualia.
This also brings us to another
one of qualia’s slippery traits, the
explanatory gap. Mary might have read
someone’s account of seeing read, and
she herself might try to articulate what
seeing red it like. However, she will fail.
To further illustrate this idea, take this
example; you and I both look at the same
swatch of the colour orange. Do you
see the same exact colour as I? Maybe.
There is no way for either of us to be
sure, we can only speculate and attempt
to describe our understanding of our
own experience. But can words clearly

Let us start with qualia. Qualia
come out of consciousness and are
related to experience and the senses.
Thomas Nagel explains qualia very
concisely in his paper What is it like
to be a bat? “the fact that an organism
has conscious experience at all means,
basically, that there is something it is like
to be that organism” (436). Qualia, as is
reiterated again and again throughout
discussion, is that they encapsulate the
quality of to-be-like something. When
an individual experiences anything,
there is a particular quality unique to
the experience for that individual. This
intrinsic nature of quale and experience
is one of the main origins for its divisive
and uncertain inquiry. But, there is a
general consensus that consciousness
is a requirement for qualia.
Like qualia, consciousness
is not well understood in scientific
terms nor agreed upon philosophically.
Exactly what constitutes consciousness
and what it is, is uncertain. This makes
it particularly difficult to define qualia,
since they rely on consciousness.
However, it is agreed that humans have
consciousness. This assumption is vital
in any discussion on ethics, and for
the most part, epistemology as well.
So, understanding that consciousness
exists, and humans have it, we can move
forward.
Qualia come out of our
consciousness, they “are intrinsic to
their subjects” (Byrne and Tye 241)
that is, there is no way for us to fully
separate qualia from our experiences.
As conscious creatures, our experiences
in the world have “characters or
qualities that consist of something it is
like for conscious subjects to be in such
36
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convey the essence of our experience
as we experience it? Doubtful. It seems
likely or inevitable that, both of us have
different qualia of this experience. If
we perceive the same colour, it might
prompt a different emotion, or thought,
and certainly present you with a
different experience than myself.
As we can see, qualia have a
level of ineffability. “These experiences
have in each case a specific subjective
character, which it is beyond our ability
to conceive” (Nagel 439). Whether the
organism in question is a bat or a fellow
human, qualia cannot be fully explained
or understood by another. This may be
due to the unique physiology behind our
eyes, skin, muscles, neurons, and brain.
While we may have the same basic
physiology, these are still unique to the
individual, since no one experiences the
world through their senses the same
as another (as far as we know). But,
beyond the senses, this explanatory
gap can also be due to our individual
mental worlds: past experiences, biases,
thoughts, and feelings about what we
are experiencing. Most likely, it is due to
both.
Because of the explanatory
gap, qualia cannot be easily described or
explained. Even a single event, a single
quale, cannot be accurately described
to another person. Rather, as we saw
with Mary, qualia are tied to experience;
qualia arise from experience and
consciousness. This experience does
not rely solely on external objects, while
they may prompt internal phenomena,
qualia are reliant on the subject’s
conscious experience and intrinsic
internal mechanisms that allow qualia
to be generated. This relationship
between qualia, which require the

mind, but also rest in some capacity on
sensations, is what will be explored in
the mind-body problem.
The mind-body problem is
the general topic of how the mind (i.e.
thoughts, emotions, experiences) relates
to the physical realm (i.e. the senses,
external stimuli). This problem arose
as we understand it today during the
Enlightenment period, when there was
a general optimism in the humanity’s
ability to know and trust in the senses.
René Descartes and George Berkeley
are two prominent writers from this
period, whose work was impacted by
the issue of qualia through the mindbody problem. This is largely because
in order for us to give substantial stock
to scientific inquiry, which is solely
based on our theory and observations,
we must also be secure in the reliability
of the senses and the physical world.
This line of thought naturally led to the
question of how the physical aspects
of existence relate to the internal ones.
Materialism attempts to answer this
question.
Materialism is a school of
thought that offers a framework for
dealing with the mind-body problem.
In terms of the philosophy of the mind,
it is “the view that the mind is the
brain and that mental states are brain
states. Mind and brain are one and
the same-- they are identical” (Mandik
77). Thoughts, feelings, consciousness,
and everything that constitutes the
mind can be reduced to purely physical
phenomena. One of the implications
of this framework is that qualia must
be rejected. As we have distinguished
qualia, they have a “what it is like”
quality that emerges from conscious
experience. Qualia have no physical
37
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manifestation, rather they are a nonmaterial property. Therefore, qualia
are irreducible to a purely physical
phenomena. This idea of a non-material
mental property is contradictory to
materialism’s framework. Thus, it cannot
be accepted in materialism. A major
issue that surrounds materialism is the
question of consciousness; it is not until
more recent years that consciousness
has been contested to be solely a
physical object. Most concerningly, in
materialist circles, there is debate as to
whether consciousness exists (Ramsey).
If it does, consciousness must be purely
physical, and therefore can be localized
within the human mind. However, there
is no consensus within neurology, nor
philosophy, that this is the case.
On the surface it would seem
that materialism offers the best solution
to the mind-body problem, since there is
no separation between the mind and the
body, there is no issue with reconciling
the two. However, in order to have this
solution, there are assumptions, logical
leaps, and concessions that must be
made. Firstly, we have to assume that
everything in the mind is material, and
concede that consciousness either does
not exist, or that it is reducible to physical
phenomena. The main implication of
this, is that humans become reducible
beings. Humanity’s reducibility does
not seem capable of being reduced
to only physical phenomena. As of
yet, materialism has been unable to
account for the subjective qualities of
experience (Agius 102; Stoljar), and
this is exactly what qualia accomplish.
Overall, the materialist framework fails
to adequately deal with complex ideas
of the mind, and, other than outright
rejection, is incapable of finding

solutions to non-material concepts.
Descartes, and particularly
Berkeley, sit away from materialism in
their epistemological queries. Both of
these philosophers offer insight into
how qualia have been an unnamed, but
central part in the mind-body problem.
Before delving into Descartes, let us
look at Berkeley’s idealism.
Idealism, like materialism,
has a range of viewpoints, but at its
core it is the antithesis of materialism.
While materialism reduces everything
to material substance, idealism brings
everything back to the mind, “according
to idealism, everything is either a mind
or something that depends on the mind”
(Mandik 45). Berkeley is the epitome of
idealism thought; in his metaphysics,
there is only the mind, and the external
world that we perceive, originates from
it. Idealism as a whole would be able
to accept qualia as a concept, but in
Berkeley’s philosophy this does not
seem to be the case:
All our ideas, sensations, or the
things which we perceive, by
whatsoever names they may be
distinguished, are visibly inactive-there is nothing of power or agency
included in them. So that one
idea or object of thought cannot
produce or make any alteration
in another. To be satisfied of the
truth of this, there is nothing else
requisite but a bare observation of
our ideas. For since they and every
part of them exist only in the mind,
it follows that there is nothing in
them but what is perceived; but
whoever shall attend to his ideas,
whether of sense or reflection, will
not perceive in them any power
or activity; there is, therefore, no
38
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such thing contained in them.
(Berkeley 173)
To unpack this viewpoint a
little, let us look at the first claim; that
ideas, sensations and things perceived
are inactive. This goes against the idea
that the sensations and perception
have no power, this would indicate
that qualia are not possible. But it is
understood that qualia are a type of
activity that relate intrinsically to our
experience.
As we have established, qualia
are unique to an individual’s experience
and subjective to their owner. Qualia
are an active quality of ideas and
sensations, which Berkeley claims
are inactive. Qualia are intrinsically
intentional,
and
this
directly
contradicts Berkeley’s conception of
what ideas and internal phenomena are
capable of (Wright 92). Furthermore,
in Berkeley’s metaphysics (which are
inseparable from his epistemology) the
mind is the only thing we can know. The
external world is forever covered with
doubt, and therefore, not “real” in the
same sense as the mind; it is the mind
that can account for reality. With the
external world being unknowable, and
the internal world being the only aspect
we can know, qualia seem to pose a
bit of a problem. Since the senses and
experience are both required, at least
in part, for qualia to arise, the concept
of qualia partially rests on the need for
material substance.
Like materialism, idealism
gives a simple answer to the mind-body
problem, particularly in Berkeley. Since
there is no material world, the body is
simply a product of the mind. So, there is
nothing to reconcile between the mind
and the body. But, in recent years there

has been less enthusiasm for idealism.
Since it is quite difficult to completely
reject the idea of material substance.
Unless we accept idealism, the mindbody problem is still a question to be
tackled.
While Berkeley is the poster
child for idealism, Descartes is the
father of dualism (Baker 11; Mandik 16).
Since Descartes originally pushed the
mind-body problem to the frontlines of
philosophical thought, his account of
dualism has been shown to have several
issues with its argumentation, or lack
thereof. Nevertheless, his philosophy
is important to understand in order to
have a firmer grasp on the mind-body
problem and the qualia that come with
it. In Descartes’ philosophy, our internal
mind is where we can begin with
knowledge “so, my knowledge of my
thought is more basic and more certain
than my knowledge of any corporeal
thing” (8). Our internal world is the
most knowable aspect of existence to
us. This is where idealism would stop,
but Descartes endeavors to merge the
physical with the immaterial through
dualism.
To
oversimplify
dualism,
it is the idea that the mind and the
body/brain are two distinct things
(Mandik 16). In Descartes, these two
are completely separate and distinct
from one another. The main question
Descartes’s dualism produces is if these
two are separate, how do they interact?
While we are not going to try to answer
this question here, we will look at how
qualia fit into the bigger picture of
dualism. “Just as the physical world is
‘populated’ by physical objects (tables,
chairs, human bodies), the mental
world is ‘populated’ by mental objects
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(mental events and states). Space is
occupied by corporeal things, the mind
by incorporeal things” (Baker 12). We
can see from Baker’s description of
dualism that qualia, which are classified
as a “mental state”, fit nicely into both
Descartes’ dualism and dualism as a
whole.
So, Descartes and Berkeley
sit along this gradient of accepting the
mind before moving out to explore
the external world. Berkeley rejects
the idea that we can know of external
objects through our senses, due to
how the senses and ideas relate to
consciousness and perception. We do
find, however, that Berkeley and Locke
sit on similar sides of the mind-body
debate, in regards to how qualia impact
our understanding of the mind-body
problem.
In Berkeley’s first four sentences
of section 25 in Treatise Concerning
Human Knowledge, he goes over a
summary of how he finds perception
relates to ideas and sensations. Berkeley
holds that the senses are indeed, the
start of our perception, agreeing with
Locke that we must gain our knowledge
from some external source. Locke and
Berkeley assert that this external source
comes through our senses, and from
there to our perception. From this, we
form ideas and concepts, which we
perceive. Bridging this gap between the
senses and our experience of them has
long been central to our understanding
of the mind-body question.
Locke’s view of the mindbody problem is that perception is
twofold, requiring both external input
and the internal workings of the mind.
This distinction is important for the
formation of ideas and how perception

operates within ourselves. The senses
are necessary for our perception to
take place. Perception, the first faculty
of the mind, makes it the threshold for
our understanding and knowledge.
According to Locke, the mind is passive
in regards to perception, and sensation
influences perception. Just as we can’t
help but taste or feel, we cannot help but
perceive sensory input. Thus, in Locke,
with one’s perception so enwrapped in
the senses, qualia are an aspect of the
lived experience.
Perception, as it is the first faculty
of the mind, exercised about our
ideas; so it is the first and simplest
idea we have from reflection,
and is by some called thinking in
general. Though thinking, in the
propriety of the English tongue,
signifies that sort of operation in
the mind about its ideas, wherein
the mind is active; where it, with
some degree of voluntary attention
considers any thing. For in bare
naked perception, the mind is, for
the most part, only passive; and
what it perceives, it cannot avoid
perceiving…
whatever alterations are made
in the body, if they reach not the
mind; whatever impressions are
made on the outward parts, if they
are not taken notice of within;
there is no perception…
So that wherever there is sense,
or perception, there some idea is
actually produced, and present in
the understanding (Locke 138).
Here, what Locke is describing
with perception, is essentially qualia.
Qualia fit into Locke’s theory of the
mind and his solution to the mind-body
problem. The senses allow perception
40
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(which also requires consciousness) to
lead to ideas, and by extension qualia.
We can see from Locke’s
“An
Essay
Concerning
Human
Understanding” that he is a dualist,
and this makes the mind-body
problem a constant factor in terms
of understanding qualia. Until Locke,
the interaction between the mind and
the external world was chalked up to
God. This classical cause is especially
embedded in Berkeley’s understanding
of the mind-body problem.
Experience ties directly into
perception in Locke’s philosophy;
the senses and perception aspects
of experience. For, our senses garner
experience from which we formulate
ideas and perceive the world (i.e. the
blind man example). It is only through
experience that we can come to know
certain things about our external
world. For example, just by looking
at a soft cat one cannot know how its
coat feels to the touch. Likewise, we
can never know what it feels like to
another person. They may agree that it
is soft, but is their concept of soft the
same as another person’s soft? We will
never know, since we are so beholden
to our singular perception. Locke takes
this into account with his concept of
perception and experience.
A problem arises from Locke’s
idea that the senses are our sole base
for knowledge. With Locke, because we
are locked so completely into our own
little perception viewpoint, the more
experiences we can gather, from the
most senses, the greater the amount of
ideas and knowledge we gain. However,
reasonable people would not agree
that a deaf or blind person is any less
knowledgeable than someone who has

hearing or sight. Afterall, compared to
the mantis shrimp, we are blind; and
compared to a dog we are essentially
deaf. But, we would not say they are
more knowledgeable than we are.
Likewise, a person with sight would not
have a much greater understanding of
what someone else sees than a blind
person would have of someone who
can see. Since, we cannot really begin to
understand another person’s perception
of the world, we are greatly limited to
cross referencing any data we have
about the external world. Furthermore,
with the explanatory gap, it would seem
that even with identical experiences
two people may not have the same
“knowledge”.
However,
Frédérique
de
Vignemont’s writings about the mindbody problem, would show how
the senses can be overridden and
qualia can be based off of “unfactual”
information. She points to the rubber
hand hypothesis, which demonstrates
how “the spatial content of bodily
experiences is shaped by the body map
which can be distorted and includes
extraneous objects” (Vignemont 89). In
the rubber hand experiment, subjects
experience a rubber arm as their own,
despite having no feeling in the foreign
object, they can feel sensations and
react when the arm is threatened. But
does this then make that quale “false” in
some sense? Or is it just as real as qualia
that come from senses as typically
experienced? These are just a few of the
questions that surround qualia.
Would language then be our
main mode for knowledge? Following
the assertion that people lacking a sense
are no more or less knowledgeable than
people with the standard faculties
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in terms of cognition. Regardless
of our sensory input, we are able to
conceive abstract ideas and reason
even with extremely limited sensory
input. Furthermore, with our senses
susceptible, qualia become extremely
subjective. Berkeley would vehemently
deny this, as he sees language as an
inhibitor for understanding.
Simone de Beauvoir deals
with the mind-body debate as well. In
her The Second Sex, she rejects the idea
that females are inferior to males based
on biology. She says “the body is the
instrument of our hold on the world, the
world appears different to us depending
on how it is grasped” (66). Here we see
that the mind-body interaction directly
impacts qualia. For our experience
is based on how our bodies interact
with the world. However, her framing
includes society, which is not a
component in this paper.
Regardless, for Berkeley, the
mind-body problem is resolved; only
the mind exists and the senses and
body muddle our perception and
understanding of the nature of reality.
But, for Locke and others the issue is
still alive and well. We have given a
general overview of what qualia are,
and how it relates to the mind-body

problem. Consciousness is a necessary
condition for qualia, but, it seems, so
are the senses. As we have seen, many
philosophers have argued about what
the senses and consciousness means
for our understanding of the world.
Materialists attempt to reduce mental
phenomena to a material cause,
while idealists argue that material is
dependant on the mind. Meanwhile,
dualists accept both the material and
immaterial and are faced with uniting
the two. With the identification of
qualia, this exchange has only gotten
deeper. Due to qualia’s immaterial
nature and its dependance on sensory
input, it has caused issues for both
materialism and idealism. Dualism, on
the other hand, is not contradicted by
qualia. Throughout this paper, we have
found that the combination of qualia’s
ineffable quality and the explanatory
gap indicates that our experiences are
inherently imbued with subjectivity
through qualia. With qualia collapsing
into our experiences, it may be near
impossible to separate the qualia from
subjective experience itself. This makes
it even more imperative to continue to
explore the concept of qualia, which can
only yield a better understanding of our
perception of the world.
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